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Avant-Garde and Neo-Avant-Garde: An Attempt to Answer Certain Critics of Theory of the Avant-Garde Peter Bürger * Deinitions “W HAT IS AN AVANT-GARDE?” I understand this question as a provocation. The strategy is not a bad one, because some- times a provocation can bring about a surprising clarity, if it causes the addressee to lay his cards on the table. Usually though, this does not happen, and for good reason. Lacan was adamantly opposed to speaking “le vrai du vrai,” arguing that the naked truth was always disappointing. In his Logic , Hegel ridiculed the arbitrariness of deini- tions that are supposed to pin down a concept to speciic properties: even though no other animal has an earlobe, it is not an adequate way of deining human beings. And Nietzsche puts it concisely: “Only that which has no history can be deined.” If such different thinkers as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Lacan—I could have also mentioned Adorno and Blumenberg—oppose deinitions, then we should listen to them. In fact, it is a practice that runs the risk of depriving the concept of what keeps it alive: the contradictions that it unites within itself. Hegel’s short text Who Thinks Abstractly? makes this clear. A murderer is being taken to his place of execution. For the bourgeois, who subjugates the world via deinitions and calculations, he is nothing but a murderer; he is, in other words, identical with his act. For the old nurse, however, who, catching sight of the head of the executed man, cries out, “Oh how beautifully the merciful sun of God shines on Binder’s head,” he is a concrete individual, who has committed a crime, received his deserved punishment for it, and is now partaking of God’s grace. 1 To be sure, dispensing with deinitions causes problems. How can we be sure that those who express their views on the avant-garde are even * German text © 2010 Peter Bürger; English translation © 2011 The Johns Hopkins University Press. New Literary History, 2010, 41: 695–715 696 NEW LITERARY HISTORY talking about the same thing? Here we have to say without illusion: we cannot. For many academics and critics the term only refers to what- ever is the most current (most progressive) movement in modern art. 2 Others even use it in a transtemporal sense—one not conined to the modern era. The painters of the early Renaissance can, in this sense, be readily discussed as an avant-garde. All this is unproblematic as long as the context makes clear what is meant in each case. We do not have to search for the “correct” concept of the avant-garde, but we can justiiably ask what these various deinitions accomplish. Whereas a nonspeciic concept of the avant-garde marks, above all, a point in the continuum of time, in other words, the Now, designating the newest art of modernity, Theory of the Avant-Garde attempts to provide a clear differentiation between two concepts, without thereby creating an abstract opposition between them. In so far as the historical avant- garde movements respond to the developmental stage of autonomous art epitomized by aestheticism, they are part of modernism; in so far as they call the institution of art into question, they constitute a break with modernism. The history of the avant-gardes, each with its own special historical conditions, arises out of this contradiction. The signiicance of the concept of the avant-garde developed in Theory of the Avant-Garde still seems to me today to lie in the fact that it does not draw up a list of individual characteristics that can be arbitrarily extended, but rather that, starting with Dadaism, surrealism, and constructivism, it develops a concept whose individual elements are integrally related. At the center of this constellation is an interpenetration of two principles: the attack on the institution of art and the revolutionizing of life as a whole. Both principles go hand in hand, indeed they mutually condition each other. The uniication of art and life intended by the avant-garde can only be achieved if it succeeds in liberating aesthetic potential from the institutional constraints which block its social effectiveness. In other words: the attack on the institution of art is the condition for the pos- sible realization of a utopia in which art and life are united. The other aspects of the avant-garde concept arise out of these two intertwined fundamental principles. By renouncing the idea of autonomy, the artist also gives up his special social position and thereby his claim to genius. (That this surrender is admittedly ambivalent is not surprising in light of the utopian character of the avant-garde project, an ambivalence that becomes evident in a igure like André Breton.) In this conception of the avant-garde, the work of art also loses the central position that it once had among modern authors and that Adorno, after the Second World War, would restore once more in his Aesthetic Theory . The work, which was for Mallarmé the goal of all human activity (“tout, au monde, AVANT-GARDE AND NEO-AVANT-GARDE 697 existe pour aboutir à un livre”) is for Breton a side issue, one which makes recognizable a certain relationship to the world—nothing more but also nothing less (“on publie pour chercher des hommes, et rien de plus” he writes in La confession dédaigneuse ). The Russian constructivists even equated the work of art with an object of use. In both cases it is subordinated to the project of revolutionizing living conditions and thus loses its aura and its illusion of metaphysical being in equal measure. The history of concepts can show how the individual aspects of a con- cept, which unfold theoretically as a necessary interrelationship, have formed themselves historically. 3 Here we should not play (theoretical) construction and history off against each other, as critics of Theory of the Avant-Garde have repeatedly done. If they were being consistent, they would have to deny the possibility of generalizing concepts altogether and to agree with Hugo von Hofmannsthal when, in objecting to the categories of worker and bourgeois, he maintained, “They’re all just people.” II. First Responses to the Theory of the Avant-Garde Soon after its publication, the book met with forceful criticism. To be sure, there is always an element of obduracy in any form of metacriticism. For this reason, in what follows, I will not conine myself to rebutting the arguments of my critics (although in some cases, of course, this is impossible to avoid). I would much rather, irst of all, use this criticism, where possible, as an opportunity to think through further what was only sketched out in Theory of the Avant-Garde , and, second, to try in each case to discern the focus from which individual critics are speaking. This will make it possible to explain certain contradictions in terms of the varying perspectives of authors. At the same time, it will help make clear the intellectual climate within which the book was written. In order to clarify these connections somewhat, I need to address wider issues. 4 In the image of artistic modernism that prevailed against conservative resistance in the period after the Second World War, especially in West Germany—I am thinking, for instance, of Hans Sedlmayr’s book Art in Crisis, The Lost Center 5 —movements intent on radical social change were largely blotted out. The irst Documenta in Kassel in 1955 makes this abundantly clear. While four of Max Ernst’s paintings were on dis- play, his association with surrealism was not mentioned. The name of Dalí was missing from the catalogue, along with that of André Breton. Modernism, as it was presented in Kassel, was a purely internal artistic phenomenon. In the introduction to the catalogue, Werner Haftmann 698 NEW LITERARY HISTORY emphasized the continuity and consistency of modern art’s develop- ment over several generations. The category of rupture was eliminated and along with it the historical avant-garde movements. The same is true for aesthetic theory and art criticism of the time. Both Theodor W. Adorno’s theory of the development of artistic material (procedures and techniques) and Clement Greenberg’s theory of a progressive reduc- tion to the essential qualities of each medium insisted on this element of continuity. Greenberg explicitly states: “Modernist art develops out of the past without gap or break.” 6 Although Adorno works with the category of rupture in Aesthetic Theory , it applies only to the structure of the artwork. Whereas Walter Benjamin in his pathbreaking 1929 essay “Surrealism” could still describe the movement as one that sought “to win the energies of intoxication for the revolution,” 7 Adorno, twenty-ive years later, stresses above all the obsolete qualities of surrealist images, in which the consciousness of failure is preserved—in a technologized world, human beings have failed themselves. 8 It is as if the historical rupture called forth by fascism were to render the very category taboo in the postwar period. This only began to change when surrealist slogans started showing up on the walls of Paris in May 1968. At this moment the historical avant-gardes and their utopian projects were also rediscovered. The impulse of hope triggered by the May ’68 movement also caught hold of German universities at the same time and led to a series of publi- cations about avant-garde movements, including my own 1970 volume Der französische Surrealismus , though, to be sure, it submits surrealist texts to the principles of academic analysis. The foundations for my later theory are laid down here—for example, the insight that the “works” of the surrealists can be read in terms of Benjamin’s concept of the allegory. When I conceived of Theory of the Avant-Garde a short time later, the impulses that the May events had awakened had already been arrested. The student movement had disintegrated into vehemently squabbling groups, each of which claimed to represent pure Marxist doctrine. In this situation, I transferred, without being conscious of it, utopian aspirations from a society in which they could clearly not be realized to theory. Theory now seemed to be the key that could keep open the door to the future that I imagined, along with Breton, as a inally liv- able world (“un monde enin habitable”). This is why the book relies so heavily on the rigor of argumentation and methodical construction. From Habermas, I had learned that the illumination of the past only succeeds insofar as it simultaneously lights up the present. The history of the historical avant-gardes and our history were mirrored in each other. Our epoch had—in the Benjaminian sense—entered into a con- stellation with a speciic past; my accomplishment was simply a matter AVANT-GARDE AND NEO-AVANT-GARDE 699 of having understood this constellation and used it as the basis for a theoretical construction. If we now cast a glance at the discussions the book stirred up after its publication, it becomes obvious that they were not primarily concerned with deining the avant-garde but rather with questions of methodol- ogy. Even its author understood Theory of the Avant-Garde as, primarily, an attempt at laying the foundations for a materialist cultural science. Repelled by vulgar Marxist “derivations” of artistic works from the socio- economic basis, whereby formal analysis was usually neglected, he had become convinced, after reading the essay on reiication in Lukács’ His- tory and Class Consciousness and the methodological relections in Marx’s Grundrisse , that a scientiic approach needed, irst of all, to discern the historical site from which the development of art in bourgeois society could be construed. The emphasis on the immanent development of art under the sign of the doctrine of autonomy, which the author set against various Marxist dogmas that were circulating at the time in the newly founded University of Bremen, are explicable in this context. According to one of the young revolutionary-minded intellectuals, for instance, a materialist aesthetic theory would have to “try to determine the functions and signiicances of aesthetic phenomena in the struggle for emancipation of the masses.” 9 Ansgar Hillach, another of the au- thors in the 1976 volume of responses to my work, took refuge in a reconstruction of Benjamin’s concept of allegory, which, however, he was not willing to apply to avant-garde practices such as montage. He then goes on to characterize automatic writing ( écriture automatique ) as “the transformation of the profane illumination of an inherently empty subjectivity into a corporeal collectivity” ( A 118). Today we might smile at this strange combination of philology and revolutionary mysticism, yet despite its extravagance, it bears witness to the desire to charge one’s own writing with revolutionary impulses. The most productive theoretical contributions to the volume are those in which my theses are questioned in terms of their implicit assumptions and confronted with Adorno’s aesthetics (Lüdke) or when the relationship between autonomy and avant-garde is deined not as a rupture but as a continuity (Lindner). As is well known, in the Hegelian category of sublation ( Aufhebung ) that I made use of, both moments are thought together. The avant- gardes, I argued, did not strive for the destruction of the art institu- tion, but rather its sublation. This would, at the same time, release its constrained aesthetic potential in order to shape ordinary life. Lindner, on the other hand, sought to strengthen Benjamin’s preferred idea of destruction—let us recall Benjamin’s plea for a “new, positive concept of barbarism.” 10 This was also typical of the discussions of the 1970s. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |
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